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1. Introduction 
Beyond its explanatory ambitions as positive science, economics has always had its normative 
or applied branch that aims at providing advice about how man’s socio-economic condition 
might be improved. Under the name welfare economics the discipline’s normative branch has 
been formalized, in the spirit of Benthamite utilitarianism, as an attempt to generalize the 
notion of rational, maximizing choice from the individual to the societal level by aggregating 
individual preferences into a compound measure of social welfare. The theoretical 
consistency and practical applicability of this aggregationist approach has long been the 
subject of controversy, and in response to objections welfare economics underwent various 
modifications and reformulations. A more recent challenge has come from an evolutionary 
outlook at economic processes, in particular from arguments that focus on the fact that the 
individual preferences on which the welfare theoretical calculus is based are themselves 
subject to evolutionary change, raising the question of how “social welfare” can serve to 
evaluate policies if the very measuring rod that it employs changes over time. This challenge 
has stimulated attempts to develop an “evolutionary welfare economics” that seeks to    
reconcile the ambitions of the discipline’s traditional applied branch with the recognition that 
we live in an evolving world in which human preferences co-evolve with the policies that are 
supposed to serve them. 
 The purpose of this paper is twofold. It will, firstly, take a closer look at the discussion 
on the need and feasibility of an evolutionary welfare economics, in particular on proposals 
for how to deal with the evolving-preferences-issue advanced by three authors, Carl Christian 
von Weizsäcker, Ulrich Witt (in part together with Christian Schubert) and Robert Sugden. 
And it will, secondly, seek to show that the research program of constitutional economics can 
deal with this issue in a more coherent and consistent way than approaches that remain within 
the mind-frame of traditional welfare economics. 
 
                                                 
∗ Prepared for the workshop on “New Frontiers in Normative Economics and Policy Advice,” jointly organized 
by the Max Planck Institut of Economics and the Walter Eucken Institut, held in Freiburg, December 10-12, 
2009. 
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2. Evolving Preferences, Social Welfare and Normative Individualism 
In their pioneering work An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982) Richard R. 
Nelson and Sidney G. Winter note that recognizing the evolutionary dynamics of economic 
reality, “in which preferences, resources, and technologies are changing over time in a way 
that is not fully predictable” (ibid.: 360), does not only call for replacing the neoclassical 
orthodoxy by an evolutionary paradigm but also points to the need for an “evolutionary 
welfare economics” (ibid.: 369). The specific issue that is of main interest in the present 
context, namely the challenge that evolving preferences pose for traditional welfare 
economics, has notably been addressed by Carl Christian von Weizsäcker in a series of 
papers, starting with his 1971 article “Notes on Endogenous Change of Tastes”. In this article 
von Weizsäcker raised the issue of “the welfare implications” (ibid.: 346) of “endogenously 
changing tastes” (ibid.), arguing that in “a world with changing tastes … it may become 
necessary to change the conceptual framework of our theory” (ibid.). The project that he 
embarked on, and to which I will return below (section 6), he described in a later contribution 
on The Welfare Economics of Adaptive Preferences as follows: “I try to overcome a particular 
obstacle to the introduction of endogenously changing preferences into economic theory. The 
obstacle is the lack of an answer to the question: how can you do welfare economics if 
preferences change endogenously? After all, preferences of individual agents are the basic 
measuring rod of economic welfare, of the performance generated in an economic system. 
How can we evaluate an economic system with a measuring rod that itself changes with the 
system?”1 
 The issue of the welfare implications of changing preferences has also been discussed, 
although from a somewhat different angle, by Ulrich Witt who, in a number of papers, has 
pointed out that with evolving preferences “the basis for normative judgments may change” 
(2003: 89), charging that the implications for “economic policy making in the presence of 
changing individual preferences have not been investigated” (ibid.: 91). Robert Sugden, the 
third author to be considered here, has looked from still another perspective at the “significant 
normative issues if the agent’s preferences cannot be assumed to be constant over time” 
(2007: 665).  “The standard methods of welfare economics,” so Sugden (2004: 1016) notes, 
“hold individuals’ preferences constant across the relevant social states, treat those constant 
preferences as measures of well-being, and ask how far they are satisfied in each state. Such 
analysis is not possible if individuals’ preferences shift.” 
                                                 
1 Von Weizsäcker (2005: 2). Von Weizsäcker adds that he considers his paper “only to be a beginning for a 
much more extensive research program about the possibility of welfare economics with endogenously 
determined tastes” (ibid.). – See also von Weizsäcker (2002: 426). 
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 The solutions to the problem of “normative judgments on economic policy making in 
the presence of changing individual preferences” that the three quoted authors propose will be 
discussed in more detail in later sections. The issue that I want to address first concerns the 
interpretation of the normative premise that is behind the charge that evolving individual 
preferences pose a problem for traditional welfare economics, namely the premise that 
individual preferences constitute the measuring rod in terms of which social welfare is to be 
assessed. My purpose is to contrast two fundamentally different interpretations of this 
premise, two interpretations that, as I shall argue, are at the heart of the difference between the 
standard paradigm of welfare economics on the one side and the research program of 
constitutional economics on the other. 
 There is and has been in the past an essential agreement among economists that 
individual preferences provide the normative standard against which social states are to be 
evaluated,2 a perspective that can be labeled normative individualism (von Weizsäcker 2002: 
420). Yet, there exist, as von Weizsäcker (ibid.: 425) notes, different versions that he broadly 
classifies into a “Kantian line” (Rawls, Sen, Buchanan) and a “utilitarian line” (Bergson, 
Samuelson, Arrow, Musgrave, Mirrlees), according to the different ways they answer the 
question of how to “move from the level of the individual to the level of the community” 
(ibid.). The related but distinct contrast that I want to focus on is between, what I propose to 
call, a utility individualism and a choice individualism (Vanberg 2005: 33f.). The difference 
between the two varieties of normative individualism can be illustrated by looking at the 
subtle shift of meaning that occurs when the notion that “individual preferences are to count” 
is substituted, as is standard practice in welfare economics, by the notion that “individual 
utilities are to count”.3 
The term “preference” has an inherent connection to human choice, the act of 
choosing among alternatives. Preferences can only be expressed by a choosing agent, and 
they have no separate existence apart from an agent’s choice. This is what the term “choice-
individualism” is meant to emphasize, namely that individual preferences expressed in choice 
are the source from which evaluations of social matters are to be derived. Utilities, by 
contrast, have no such inherent connection to human choice. They are, per se, not about 
choosing among alternatives but about value-relations between persons and items that may 
                                                 
2 D.M. Hausman and M.S. McPherson (1996: 69): “Economists typically evaluate outcomes in only one way – in 
terms of individual welfare. … Since the evaluation of outcomes rests exclusively on their consequences for 
individual welfare, the theory of individual welfare is crucial to normative economics.” 
3 A typical example for the shift between “preferences” and “utilities” can be seen in J.C. Harsanyi’s (1982: 54) 
statement: “The utilitarian theory I have proposed defines social utility in terms of individual utilities, and 
defines each person’s utility function in terms of his personal preferences. Thus, in the end, social utility is 
defined in terms of people’s preferences. This approach may be called preference utilitarianism.” 
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become the object of choice. Conceptually, utilities can be identified independent of any real 
act of choice.4 Most importantly, and this is what the term “utility individualism” is meant to 
emphasize, once “measured” individual utilities can be separated from their individual source 
and be aggregated (and traded-off) into a compound measure of social welfare. By contrast, 
such aggregation is not conceivable for preferences as they are expressed in real choices. 
Preferences cannot be added up (or traded-off) across individuals. 
Utility-individualism is interested in individual persons only as “metering-points” 
from which utility values are collected, then to be processed in a social welfare calculus. The 
person as a sovereign chooser is lost out of sight.5 As A. Sen and B. Williams (1982: 4) put it: 
“Essentially, utilitarianism sees persons as locations of their respective utilities … . Once note 
has been taken of the person’s utility, utilitarianism has no further direct interest in any 
information about him. … Persons do not count as individuals in this any more than 
individual petrol tanks do in the analysis of the national consumption of petroleum.”6 By 
contrast, choice-individualism looks at individuals as the ultimate sovereigns in social affairs 
whose voluntary and informed (the significance of these attributes will be discussed later) 
choices are the only source from which the observing economist can derive conclusions about 
social welfare. 
In discussions on issues of welfare economics the critical difference between the two 
versions of normative individualism is too easily hidden behind an ambiguous language that 
obfuscates the fundamental difference between counting individual utilities and allowing 
individual choices to shape social outcomes.7 Such ambiguity is present, for instance, when 
Harsanyi (1982: 55) emphasizes that his version of “preference utilitarianism” is “consistent 
with the important philosophical principle of preference autonomy” on which he comments: 
                                                 
4 The recognition that utilities can only be measured in ordinal and not in cardinal terms is a concession to 
difficulties of measuring such value-relations but does not mean that individuals as choosers are brought into 
focus. 
5 Buchanan (1979: 25f.): “If the utility function of the choosing agent is fully defined in advance, choice 
becomes purely mechanical. No ‘decision,’ as such, is required; there is no weighing of alternatives. … If I know 
what I want, a computer can make all of my choices for me. If I do not know what I want, no possible computer 
can derive my utility function since it does not really exist.” – The issue raised by Buchanan is referred to by von 
Weizsäcker (2002: 442) when he notes that the preferences that govern choices may not be fully formed in 
advance, that individuals may not care to form preferences for hypothetical choice situations, as long as they not 
actually confront them.  
6 Sugden (2004: 1017): “It is a folk saying in the discipline that, as far as theory is concerned, an individual is a 
preference ordering: everything the theorist needs to know about a person is contained in that person’s 
preference.” – As I have documented elsewhere (Vanberg 2008: 606) this outlook at individuals as utility 
functions can be traced back to Leon Walras whose successor on the Lausanne chair, Vilfredo Pareto, stated that 
once we have obtained “a photograph of his tastes … the individual can disappear.” 
7 Sen and Williams (1982: 12) refer to this ambiguity when they note: “There is by now a well-established 
tradition in modern economics of defining utility in terms of choice, and at the same time insisting that it must 
also have a particular content in terms of what is maximised. … The ambiguity of the term ‘preference’ 
facilitates this dual picture of utility, since linguistic convention seems to permit the treatment of ‘preferring’ as 
choosing as well as taking what a person (really) ‘prefers’ as what would make him better off.” 
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“By this I mean the principle that, in deciding what is good and what is bad for a given 
individual, the ultimate criterion con only be his own wants and his own preferences” (ibid.). 
The term “autonomy” would seem to imply that the individual is recognized as a sovereign 
chooser, but what it means in Harsanyi’s construction is that his utility will be included in the 
social welfare calculus, eliminating the individual as sovereign chooser once his utility values 
are determined.8 After all, for Harsanyi (1982: 40) social utility is “defined either as the sum, 
or the arithmetic mean, of the utility levels of all individuals in the society.”9  
A similar ambiguous shift of meaning between recognizing individuals’ autonomy and 
taking account of their preferences occurs when von Weizsäcker (2008: 8) argues: “The way 
economists or social philosophers model free actions … is by reference to the preferences of 
the agent. But then, maximization of freedom means maximization of the influence of 
preferences on the social outcome of actions.”10 Maximizing the influence of individual 
preferences on social outcomes can either refer to the influence of individuals’ choices on 
political decision making, as might be read into von Weizsäcker’s statement that outcomes 
should be maximally dependent on the wishes of the individual involved (ibid.: 215). Or it 
may refer to the counting of individual utilities in a social preference function, as von 
Weizsäcker appears to imply when he argues that individuals freedom of choice is represented 
in economic modeling by the preferences that determine individual action (ibid.: 212).11 The 
tension, present in both Harsanyi’s and von Weizsäcker’s arguments, between the notion that 
individual utilities are to count as entries in a social welfare function and the notion that 
individuals should be able to shape by their own choices the social world in which they live 
marks the essential difference between welfare economics and constitutional economics, a 
difference that is the subject of the following section. 
 
                                                 
8 Sen and Williams (1982: 13) comment on Harsanyi’s concept of preference autonomy: “The derivation of 
importance of the thing chosen from the fact of choice must not be confused with regarding the ability of people 
to choose as important in itself. ‘Autonomy’ as a value is concerned with the latter, but it belongs to an approach 
altogether different from utilitarianism, and is concerned with valuing the capability to choose rather than 
valuing the thing chosen. Valuing autonomy works directly in favour of supporting choice.” 
9 Harsanyi (1998: 290): “As I tried to show in earlier publications …, the impartially considered welfare of 
society as a whole at any given time can be measured by its social utility function, defined as the arithmetic 
mean of all individuals’ utility functions in this society. … Under this definition, our social utility function 
would be defined in terms of all individuals’ utility functions.” 
10 Von Weizsäcker (2009: 215): “Das Ergebnis der sozialen Interaktion freier Menschen soll Spiegelbild des 
Willens dieser Menschen sein, soll also möglichst weitgehend davon abhängen, was der konkrete Wille dieser 
Menschen ist.” 
11 Von Weizsäcker (2009: 214): “Für …das was wir vielleicht auch normative Ökonomik nennen können, ist … 
im herkömmlichen Ansatz der Begriff der Präferenzen von zentraler Bedeutung. Die Präferenzen sind hier 
Platzhalter für den Begriff der Freiheit.” – See also (ibid.: 212): “Freiheit ist für das Individuum dann und 
insoweit gegeben, als es Wahlalternativen hat … . Der betrachtende Wirtschaftstheoretiker, der das Handeln des 
Individuums beschreiben, also ‘modellieren’ möchte, setzt an dieser Stelle die Präferenzen als 
Bestimmungsfaktor des tatsächlichen Handelns des Individuums ein .”  
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3. Welfare Economics, Constitutional Economics and Policy Advice 
Utility-individualism is the paradigmatic foundation of welfare economics as a research 
enterprise that takes its departure from measures of individual utility in order to derive 
measures of social welfare on which policy recommendations can be based. Choice-
individualism is the paradigmatic foundation of constitutional economics as a research 
enterprise that takes its departure from the premise that individuals are the ultimate sovereigns 
in social matters and that, in light of this premise, seeks to arrive at conjectures about policy 
measures, in particular choices of rules, that promise mutual gains for all parties involved and 
that, therefore, can be agreed upon by sovereign individuals. 
   It is because of the different versions of normative individualism on which they are 
based that welfare economics and constitutional economics give categorically different 
answers to the question of how to “move from the level of the individual to the level of the 
community” (Weizsäcker 2002: 425). James Buchanan has characterized the two different 
answers as maximization paradigm on the one side and gains-from-trade paradigm on the 
other.12 Welfare economics, so Buchanan argues, seeks to bridge the gap between the 
individual level and the community level by generalizing the notion of rational choice, 
understood as utility maximizing choice, from the level of individual action to the policy level. 
Just as the rationality of individual action is identified with choosing that which maximizes 
the individual’s utility, so “rational politics” is identified with choosing what maximizes the 
community’s welfare or utility.13 By contrast, the constitutional economics approach that 
Buchanan advocates bridges this gap by generalizing the notion of mutual gains from 
voluntary trade from the level market interaction, where it is traditionally applied, to the level 
of collective-political choice. Just as at the level of ordinary market exchange the economist’s 
presumption of “social goodness” or efficiency is not derived from some aggregation of 
utilities across the trading parties, but is ultimately based on no other grounds than that the 
transaction in question is the result of voluntary choice of the parties involved, so the 
efficiency or “social goodness” of policy measures must, from the perspective of 
constitutional economics, ultimately be judged in terms of whether they reflect the voluntary 
choices of the individuals involved, and cannot be measured by aggregating individual 
utilities. 
                                                 
12 As Buchanan charges (1979: 150ff.), by bridging the individual-community gap in this way welfare economics 
falls victim to “methodological confusion” because, in violation of the methodological individualism that 
otherwise is considered the trade-mark of economic analysis, it treats a community composed of individuals as if 
it were a single actor with its own scale of values. 
13 Buchanan’s arguments that are only briefly summarized here are discussed in more detail in Vanberg (2005: 
26ff., 33ff.).  
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 The different paradigms that welfare economics and constitutional economics employ 
in bridging the individual-community gap guide their respective research efforts into 
systematically different directions. The maximization paradigm focuses the research 
ambitions of welfare economics essentially on two questions, namely, first, how individual 
utility values can be assessed, and, second, how these individual values can be compounded 
into an aggregate measure of social welfare.14 The various discussions – be they about the 
measurability of utility, the compensation issue or other matters – that have surrounded the 
history of welfare economics have all been concerned with one or the other of these two 
questions. By contrast, the gains-from-trade paradigm directs the attention of constitutional 
economics to the question of how, by which institutional arrangements, sovereign individuals 
can best be enabled to realize mutual gains, be it through ordinary market exchange, be it 
through the more complex “trading arrangements” that they engage in when they organize for 
collective action, including politics. Instead of looking at individual utilities as inputs into a 
social utility function constitutional economics looks at individual choices as inputs into 
social processes, whether in markets or in politics, asking how these processes may be 
organized so as to improve the prospects for mutual gains. In other words, while the 
maximization paradigm focuses the attention of welfare economics on the evaluation of social 
outcomes, the gains-from-trade paradigm focuses the attention of constitutional economics on 
the nature of the processes from which social outcomes result. Constitutional economics 
insists that, just as in the case of market exchange “efficiency” is an attribute that cannot be 
directly read from exchange-outcomes but is concluded from the voluntary nature of the 
transaction, the efficiency of social outcomes generally, be they market outcomes or outcomes 
of political processes, cannot be judged in terms of  outcome-characteristics per se but only in 
terms of the nature of the processes from which they result, specifically in terms of the extent 
to which these processes can be presumed to reflect voluntary and informed choices of the 
persons involved.15 
 The fundamental differences between welfare economics and constitutional economics 
come into an even sharper focus when one takes a closer look at the advisory role that they 
                                                 
14 As K.J. Arrow (1971: 2) has put it, the concern of welfare economics is with the “procedure for passing from a 
set of known individual tastes to a pattern of social decision making.”  
15 It is worth quoting what J.A. Mirrlees (1982: 82f.) as an advocate of utilitarian welfare economics notes on the 
contrast between an outcome-oriented and a process-oriented perspective: “This line of argument goes some way 
to meet the claim that … ‘Utilitarianism is concerned only to evaluate outcomes, whereas in considering, e.g., 
the determination of economic policies, we should also be concerned about the process of choice.’ … It must be 
agreed that a utility-maximizing government may not be the best kind to try to have … . It may be better to have 
a constitution-constrained government, in part controlled also by conventions that it should consult all concerned 
groups on issues, and not discriminate against particular groups. … Utilitarianism does not give an instant to the 
question what kind of constitution, bill of rights, or government is optimal.” 
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can be expected to play in democratic politics. Advice that an empirical science like 
economics can give can only come in the form of what philosophers call hypothetical 
imperatives, i.e. statements that tell an addressee what, on prudential grounds, he should do if 
he wants to achieve his supposed goals. Such hypothetical imperatives are, by contrast to 
categorical imperatives, not genuine value judgments – the passing of which would be beyond 
the proper scope of an empirical science – but refutable conjectures about what are suitable 
means to achieve presumed purposes. If welfare economists do not want to claim the 
authority to issue categorical imperatives they must regard their policy recommendations as 
hypothetical imperatives, and that means they must have an addressee in mind whom their 
recommendations are supposed to assist in the pursuit of his aims. It is in regard to the 
question of its addressee that welfare economics has been notoriously ambiguous. 
 In a democratic polity as, in John Rawls’s (1971: 84) terms, a “cooperative venture for 
mutual advantage” the citizens are the principals in whose common interest the collective 
enterprise is to be operated. They are the natural ultimate addressees of policy advice while 
the politicians to whom the citizens-principals have delegated decision making authority are 
the proximate addressees. It is not at all obvious why either of these two potential addressees 
should be interested in the kind of advice that welfare economics provides, namely how to 
maximize social welfare. Public choice theory is well known for having accused welfare 
economics for its unrealistic outlook at politics, for disregarding the fact that the arena of 
politics – not different from markets – is populated by self-interested agents who wish to 
know how they can effectively promote their own political careers but have little interest in 
being told how they can maximize social welfare, especially if this gets in the way of their 
personal goals. And as far as the ultimate addressees, the citizens, are concerned it is equally 
doubtful that they are interested in recommendations for how social welfare can be promoted, 
except these recommendations can also be shown to promote their own well-being. If, 
however, the recommendations that welfare economists provide have no identifiable 
addressee to whose own interest they can appeal, it is unclear which role welfare economics is 
meant to play in advising democratic politics. Without an addressee whom they inform about 
suitable means to pursue his own aims the hypothetical imperatives that welfare economics 
produces are “hanging in the air”. 
 By contrast, there is no ambiguity at all about to whom constitutional economists 
address their advice. According to the very logic of the gains-from-trade paradigm the only 
meaningful addressee are the individuals for whom the constitutional economist’s 
hypothetical imperatives promise mutual gains. As an applied science constitutional 
8
 #0919 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
economics aims at informing the members of the group in question, in case of a democratic 
polity its citizens, about policy measures, in particular institutional reforms, that promise 
gains for all parties involved. The recommendations that constitutional economists provide 
are, accordingly, subject to the requirement of being able to show, why each individual 
member of the respective group can expect to benefit from the recommended measure. As far 
as politicians, in their role as the agents of the citizens-principals, are the proximate 
addressees of advice, constitutional economics distinguishes categorically between, on the 
one side, recommendations that inform politicians about measures that promise to benefit the 
citizenry at large and, on the other side, recommendation that inform them about measures 
that promise to promote their own political careers. The principal interest of constitutional 
economists is in offering the first kind of recommendations, even if they recognize that 
politicians will have an interest in heeding them only to the extent that promoting the 
citizenry’s common welfare at the same time serves their career prospects. In an ideally 
organized polity the rules of politics would perfectly align the career interests of politicians 
with the common interests of the citizenry. Real world polities can, however, not be expected 
to be so ideally organized. Where a systematic discrepancy exists between measures that 
serve citizens common interests and measures that serve politicians career interests, 
constitutional economics diagnoses a deficiency in the capacity of the institutional framework 
of politics to make policy choices responsive to common citizens’ interests. Such diagnosis 
gives reason to inquire into the possibility of appropriate institutional reforms. 
Figuratively speaking, the constitutional economist must consider himself in the role 
of an adviser addressing a general assembly to whose members he must provide arguments 
for why the measures he proposes are capable of making everybody better off. The common 
good must, from the perspective of constitutional economics, be strictly understood as that 
which is in the common interest of all members of the respective group.16 There is, within this 
research program, no logical foundation for requiring individual members of a group to accept 
personal sacrifice for the common good of the group, except the willingness to accept such 
sacrifice is required by rules that all members have agreed upon because their general 
application is to their common benefit. Constitutional economics insists that there can be no 
other ultimate test of common interest and mutual gains than voluntary agreement among all 
persons involved. 
                                                 
16 It is interesting to note that Harsanyi (1982: 43) describes his utilitarian approach to ethics as “a theory of 
rational behavior in the service of the common interests of society as a whole.” His test for the presence of 
common interests must, of course, be different from the agreement test of constitutional economics. 
9
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 In light of the above comments on the paradigmatic differences between the utility 
individualism of welfare economics and the choice individualism of constitutional economics 
I will take, in the following sections, a closer look at the respective solutions that von 
Weizsäcker, Sugden and Witt propose for the challenge that evolving preferences pose for  
economic policy advice. 
 
4.  C.C. von Weizsäcker’s Welfare Economics of Endogenous Preferences 
Carl Christian von Weizsäcker’s ambition is to meet the challenge of changing preferences 
within the paradigmatic framework of traditional welfare economics, maintaining its utility-
individualism.17 Yet, as I shall seek to show, as far as they are concerned with actual policy 
advice his arguments appear, in fact, to be much closer to the choice individualism of 
constitutional economics than the utilitarian-welfarist perspective that he wishes to maintain. 
   The traditional question of welfare economics, namely “How do we get from 
individual preferences to policy choices?” (Weizsäcker 2002: 426) finds, so von Weizsäcker 
argues, no longer a straightforward answer if the simplifying assumption of exogenously 
given, fixed preferences is replaced by the recognition that individual preferences co-evolve 
with the social states for which they are supposed to provide the measuring rod. As he 
(Weizsäcker 2005: 5) puts it, under the assumption of fixed preferences “the utility function 
provides a complete pre-ordering of the commodity space,” such that a change from social 
state A to state B can be judged to represent an improvement or “progress” if it “can be 
identified with rising (ordinal) utility” (ibid.). Yet, so he notes, such “pre-ordering of the 
commodity space” is no longer possible with endogenously changing preferences, raising the 
question of whether we can “maintain a similar ‘utilitarian’ approach” (ibid.) in evaluating 
policy measures that aim at replacing a social state A by state B. 
 Von Weizsäcker’s (2005: 2) answer to this question is that, while welfare economics 
in the traditional meaning of this concept would obviously be impossible if preferences were 
to change in an arbitrary manner, a “similar ‘utilitarian’ approach” may well be maintained if 
“some ‘laws of motion’ of preferences” (ibid.) can be identified according to which 
preferences change along non-circular “improvement paths” (ibid.: 4). Preferences that 
change in such manner he calls “adaptive preferences,” and he states as his “main theorem” 
that with “adaptive preferences” the “possibility of defining ‘improvement’ through time even 
                                                 
17 C.C. von Weizsäcker (2002: 425f.): “Es ist dann zur leichteren Verständlichkeit und Verständigung sinnvoll 
zu sagen, dass ich mich selbst dem Mainstream zugehörig fühle. Ich werde also im Folgenden auch dem Jargon 
der ‚Welfare Economics’ folgen. … Mein Beitrag soll darin bestehen, … einen Vorschlag zu unterbreiten, wie 
man auch bei endogenen Präferenzen im Sinne des normativen Individualismus Welfare Economics … betreiben 
kann.“ 
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with endogenous preferences” (ibid.) is maintained such that “again a pre-ordering of the 
commodity space can be constructed which is related to the concept of improvement” (ibid.: 
5). Such conceptual modification can, according to von Weizsäcker, provide the theoretical 
foundation for an evolutionary welfare economics that extends the traditional welfare calculus 
from exogenously given, fixed preferences to endogenously evolving, adaptive preferences. 
 My concern here is not with the issue of how successful von Weizsäcker’s “hypothesis 
of adaptive preferences” (ibid.: 26) is in consistently integrating evolving preferences into the 
framework of utilitarian welfare economics. My concern is exclusively with the question of 
how, in what ways, von Weizsäcker’s proposed solution, even if it succeeds in the sense 
noted, can serve to advise economic policy in a democratic society as a “cooperative venture 
for mutual advantage.” As argued above, policy recommendations – as hypothetical 
imperatives – must be addressed to someone whose interests they supposedly serve. And in a 
democratic polity the citizens are the ultimate addressees while their political representatives 
the proximate addressees of advice. Neither of the two potential addressees, so I argued 
above, can be assumed to be interested in the advice of traditional welfare economics for how 
to promote aggregate social welfare, if such advice does not promise them to be in line with 
their own interests. And there is no reason why they should be any more interested in the 
information that an evolutionary welfare economics can provide about how “adaptive 
preferences” may be aggregated in a social welfare calculus. Indeed, in his own comments on 
matters of policy choice C.C. von Weizsäcker appears to make little use of the welfare 
theoretical construct that his “hypothesis of adaptive preferences” is supposed to support. 
Instead, his arguments are phrased in terms of individual freedom, compossible individual 
rights and the choice among alternative rule-regimes, in terms, that is, that fit quite naturally 
into the conceptual framework of constitutional economics. 
 When von Weizsäcker (2002: 429) speaks of the individual’s concrete acts of choice 
(“die konkrete Willensäußerung des Individuums”) which theorists of democracy and 
normative economists respect as expressions of personal autonomy (“Ausdruck seiner 
Autonomie als Person”) this is surely more in the spirit of a choice-individualism that looks at 
individuals as sovereign choosers than in the spirit of a utility-individualism that reduces 
individuals to carriers of utility values. The same can be said when von Weizsäcker associates 
a polity’s responsiveness to citizens’ preferences with the country’s liberty,18 and when he 
discusses the “principle of maximal influence of preferences on social matters” in terms of an 
effective system of compatible or – in reference to Steiner (1977) – “compossible” individual 
                                                 
18 Von Weizsäcker (2009: 215): “Je freier ein Land ist, desto mehr sollen die Zustände dieses Landes Ausdruck 
der Präferenzen seiner Bürger sein.“ 
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rights (von Weizsäcker 2009: 215f.).19 And it can furthermore be said when von Weizsäcker, 
from discussing responsiveness to preferences in terms of rights that protect individual 
freedom, proceeds to discussing the issue of “efficiency” in economic policy in terms of a 
comparison between alternative systems of rights or “regimes.”20 Such comparison appears to 
be much more in line with the rule- and process-oriented perspective of constitutional 
economics than with the outcome-oriented approach of traditional welfare economics. 
 While von Weizsäcker’s arguments on regime choice take their departure from a 
conventional welfare theoretical concept of efficiency, they end with an explicit reference to a 
contractarian perspective. A policy measure, so von Weizsäcker argues in the terminology of 
utility-individualism, can be called efficient if the monetary value of the utility of the 
beneficiaries exceeds the monetary value of the harm suffered by those who are negatively 
affected (von Weizsäcker 1998: 265).  In reference to the discussion on the compensation 
issue he notes that, while theoretically possible for efficient projects, compensation is 
practically impossible because of insurmountable information- and incentive-problems (ibid.: 
266) As his own proposal for how to approach the compensation issue he then suggests to 
look at it as a matter of regime choice, shifting the focus from the level of single projects to 
the level of institutional regimes. With this shift in perspective the relevant question becomes 
whether a regime is efficient in the sense that it creates overall, i.e. in the sum of projects that 
are carried out within its framework, sufficient benefits for compensating the participants for 
losses they may incur in particular instances, even though their losses go uncompensated in 
these instances. The point of the shift in perspective that he suggests is, as von Weizsäcker 
(1984: 128ff.; 1998: 279f.) explains, to replace the notion of single-case-compensation with 
the concept of general compensation, a concept that, in the end, he  recommends in 
contractarian terms rather than in the language of a social welfare calculus. The idea of 
general compensation can, so he argues, be understood in analogy to Hobbes’ social contract 
(von Weizsäcker 1984: 131; 1998: 279f.). Just as the members of society have reasons to 
agree to the Hobbesian contract because of the benefits they can expect from their joint 
submission to the state’s monopoly of coercion, so, according to von Weizsäcker, the 
                                                 
19 Von Weizsäcker (2009: 216): “Eine Theorie der freien Gesellschaft muss damit die Grenzen der Freiheit des 
Einzelnen modellieren. Der Zustand der Gesellschaft kann nicht nur Spiegelbild der Präferenzen der Individuen 
sein. Er muss zugleich auch die Rechte abbilden, die den einzelnen Handelnden zustehen und die miteinander 
kompatibel, also vereinbar sein müssen.“ – See also (ibid.: 241): “Präferenzen repräsentieren … das Ziel der 
normativen ökonomischen Theorie, das in einer funktionsfähigen freiheitlichen Gesellschaft liegt. Diese aber 
muss sich einen Rahmen von Rechten setzen, die dem Prinzip der bedingten Vereinbarkeit von Individualrechten 
folgen.“ 
20 Commenting on how a normative economics with its concern for “a functioning free society” looks at the 
relation between “liberty and efficiency” on Weizsäcker (2009: 241) notes: “Der Effizienzgedanke ist hier 
unabweisbar in der Abwägung zwischen unterschiedlichen ‘Freiheiten’.” 
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members of society have reasons to agree to a regime from which they can expect to benefit 
overall in ways that outweigh the losses that it may require them to accept. 
 While von Weizsäcker expressly sees himself with his theoretical proposals in the 
tradition of conventional welfare economics, his reference to the social contract notion 
amounts, in my view, in effect to no less than a tacit shift from a welfare theoretical to 
constitutional economics outlook, from an outlook that is focused on the aggregation of 
individual utilities to an outlook that seeks to inform sovereign individuals about contractual 
arrangements that promise mutual gains. Approaching the task of policy advice in a 
democratic society from a social contract perspective naturally requires one to support policy 
recommendations by arguments that can convince citizens why the recommended measures 
promise to serve their interests. And inquiring into such arguments is an entirely different task 
than solving the welfare economic puzzle of how alternative policies measure up in terms of 
aggregated individual utilities. In this sense the research project that von Weizsäcker’s 
reference to the social contract analogy points to has little in common with the welfare 
theoretical project that he wishes to maintain. 
 
5. Robert Sugden: Preference Instability and Consumer Sovereignty 
While C.C. von Weizsäcker’s declared ambition is to account for evolving preferences within 
the utility-individualist framework of traditional welfare economics, Robert Sudgen’s 
response to the challenge that changing preferences pose for welfare economics aims in a 
quite different direction. He explicitly proposes a paradigmatic shift to a choice-individualist 
perspective, even if he does not use this particular label.  
If, so Sugden (2007: 665) argues, agents’ preferences cannot be assumed to be 
constant over time a welfare economics that wants “to make normative comparisons between 
very different social states” (2004: 1016) faces obvious difficulties,21 raising the question of 
how a “measure of well-being” (ibid.: 1015) may be conceptualized that would allow for such 
comparisons notwithstanding unstable preferences. For Sugden (ibid.: 1017) answering this 
question “requires a fundamental shift in normative thinking,” namely a shift away “from the 
principle that preference satisfaction is a measure of wellbeing.” By contrast to the traditional 
welfare theoretical practice of representing individuals as utility- or preference-functions he 
asserts that “we need some other way of representing the individual person as a continuing 
agent” (ibid.). The alternative he suggests is to look at a person as “a continuing locus of 
                                                 
21 As an example Sugden (2004: 1016) mentions the comparison “between a future in which international trade 
is subject to tariffs and one in which it is not.” 
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responsibility – for short, a responsible agent” (ibid.: 1018),22 a perspective that is meant to 
“allow a sequence of actions to be understood as the composition of the deliberate choices of 
a single continuing agent, even if those choices cannot be rationalized by a single preference 
ordering over outcomes” (2007: 671). 
 The concept of a person as “a locus of responsibility” (ibid.: 672) that Sugden 
proposes reflects, as he notes, a normative intuition that “underlies the familiar concept of 
consumer sovereignty” (2004: 1016), namely that “it is good that each person is free to get 
what she wants, in so far as this is possible within the constraints imposed by other people’s 
being free to get what they want” (ibid.). While “retaining the principle of consumer 
sovereignty that has been central to the mainstream tradition of welfare economics” (ibid.: 
1014), Sugden wishes, though, “to reformulate the idea of consumer sovereignty,” namely, by 
contrast to its standard interpretation “in terms of the satisfaction of coherent preferences,” as 
the principle “that it is good for an individual to have a wide range of alternative options from 
which to choose” (ibid.: 1016). His reformulation he describes as “a robust interpretation of 
the principle of consumer sovereignty, attaching value to an agent’s opportunities to act as she 
chooses, whether or not her preferences are stable” (2007: 266).23 
 If the juxtaposition of utility-individualism and choice-individualism reflects, as I 
suppose it does, the paradigmatic divide between traditional welfare economics and 
constitutional economics, Robert Sugden’s “robust interpretation of the principle of consumer 
sovereignty” would seem to put him squarely on the side of constitutional economics. In fact, 
however, the version of choice-individualism that he advocates appears to be in conflict with 
the emphasis on “the reason of rules” (Brennan and Buchanan 1985) that is the very 
trademark of constitutional economics. In the way he specifies it, Sudgen’s normative 
intuition “that it is good for an individual to be free to choose” seems to ignore the 
constitutional dimension of individual sovereignty to which the constitutionalist perspective 
seeks to draw attention, namely the insight that individuals may have good reasons to choose 
to impose, individually and jointly, rule-constraints on their future conduct because by doing 
so they can hope to realize benefits that otherwise would be unattainable.  
 Sugden’s arguments on this matter seem to suggest that one reason for his failure to 
acknowledge the constitutional dimension of individual sovereignty may be an insufficient 
                                                 
22 Sugden (2004: 1018): “My alternative proposal is to represent agency in terms of a normative disposition: 
responsiblility. The continuing agency of a person across time is to be understood as the continued existence of a 
self-acknowledged locus of responsibility.” – Sugden (2007: 671): “This concept of the continuing agent can be 
expressed in terms of responsibility.” 
23 Sugden (2004: 1014): “The normative intuition on which my approach is based (is) that, for each individual, 
opportunities to choose between alternative options have value, irrespective of whether or not those choices can 
be rationalized in terms of stable preferences.” 
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separation of the problem of commitment from the problem of paternalism. The “robust 
interpretation of the principle of consumer sovereignty” that he advocates Sugden (2007: 666) 
expressly describes as an “anti-paternalistic perspective,” emphasizing his disagreement with 
advocates of a “libertarian paternalism” who argue “that opportunities can have negative 
value when individuals act on unstable and unconsidered preferences” (ibid.).24 Noting that 
his proposed perspective may not appeal to everyone he states: “But I hope I will find favour 
with those readers whose inclinations, like mine, are to value the freedom of the individual to 
choose how to live his own life without interference from others, to change his mind as and 
when he sees fit, and to make his own mistakes and live with the consequences” (ibid.: 680). 
In this statement and in related comments Sugden implicitly identifies two quite different 
notions with each other, namely, on the one side, the notion that “interference from others” is 
in conflict with the normative principle of individual sovereignty and, on the other side, the 
notion that to “value the freedom of the individual to choose how to live his own life” is in 
conflict with “commitment and self-control.”25 There is, however, surely a difference 
between a paternalism that lacks respect for the choice-autonomy of sovereign individuals26 
and an approach that emphasizes the role of commitment, both in organizing one’s personal 
life as well as in social organizational matters. 
                                                
One may well argue, as Sugden (2004: 1018) does, that “if an individual is understood 
as a continuing locus of responsibility, any increase in that individual’s lifetime opportunity is 
good for her in an unambiguous sense.” Yet, from a constitutional economics perspective this 
statement needs to be qualified by the recognition that taking advantage of the constitutional 
level of choice is an important way of “increasing an individual’s lifetime opportunity.” The 
central message of constitutional economics is that individuals can, individually and jointly, 
make choices not only within constraints, at a sub-constitutional level, but can also, to some 
extent, choose, at a constitutional level, the very constraints within which they act, and that 
such constitutional choice of constraints is a most important means for individuals, separately 
and jointly, to achieve their self-chosen goals. To assert, as Sudgen (ibid.) does, that a “person 
who identifies with her future actions will not want to impose external constraints on her 
future choices as a way of forcing those choices to match her current conceptions of what is 
good for her” simply rules out the possibility that a sovereign persons may want, for good 
 
24 Of his proposed outlook Sugden (2007: 680) says that it “reflects a way of thinking about opportunity and 
agency which is robustly anti-paternalistic.” 
25 In a footnote Sugden (2007: 680) contrasts his own approach to a study that supposes agents to have a 
“preference for commitment and self-control” arguing: “An agent who is ‘responsible’ in the sense in which I 
use the term has a preference for not committing his choices in advance.”  
26 The issue of whether the literature on “libertarian paternalism” that Sugden refers to is in fact guilty of lacking 
such respect can be left aside here.  
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reasons, to exercise her choice-autonomy at the constitutional level, in order to improve the 
prospects for her to become the kind of person she wishes to be, and it does not consider the 
possibility that a group of persons may, again for good reasons, want to jointly submit to 
constitutional constraints that would allow them to play a “better game” than they can in the 
absence of these constraints. Recognizing the “reason of rules” requires one to acknowledge 
that it is not necessarily good for a person “that, at each moment, she is free to satisfy 
whatever preferences she then has” (Sugden 2004: 1018), but that a sovereign person may 
well choose for prudential reasons to submit to limiting constitutional constraints. 
 
6. Ulrich Witt’s More Objective Utilitarian Approach 
By contrast to Robert Sugden’ defense of a “robust interpretation of the principle of consumer 
sovereignty,” for Ulrich Witt the challenge that preference change poses provides a reason to 
question the “radical preference subjectivism” (Witt 2003: 90) that is behind the concept of 
consumer sovereignty.27 According to Witt, in the presence of changing individual 
preferences “radical preference subjectivism and it’s more practical relatives, consumer 
sovereignty or, for that matter, voter sovereignty, may … no longer provide the relevant 
measuring rod” (ibid.) for policy making. As an alternative to a purely subjectivist outlook at 
preferences he proposes to adopt a “more objective utilitarian approach” that, as he puts it, 
incorporates “a theory about how preferences are formed and how, and under what conditions, 
they change over time,” a theory that would allow one “to assess the implications for the 
development over time of the well being of individuals and, hence, the common good” (ibid.). 
 From Witt’s arguments, presented in a number of papers on the subject, it is not 
perfectly obvious with which of the two alternative paradigms that I have contrasted here, the 
utility-individualism of welfare economics and the choice-individualism of constitutional 
economics, he wishes to associate the “more objective utilitarian approach” that he proposes. 
In other words, there seems to be some ambiguity as to whether his approach is meant as a 
proposal for how to improve a utility-individualism that seeks to derive policy 
recommendations from assumptions about individual preferences, or as a proposal for how to 
improve a choice-individualism that focuses on the procedures by which sovereign 
individuals can be enabled to realize mutual gains. The label “more objective utilitarian 
approach” that he adopts for the perspective he advocates would seem to imply a closer 
                                                 
27 Commenting on “radical preference subjectivism” Witt (2003: 90, fn. 12) notes: “On its basis the common 
good problem appears as a problem of aggregating autonomous individual preferences in a properly chosen (set 
of) variable(s) and of identifying maxima, or at least improvements … if alternative states or policies are 
compared. Such a comparative statics exercise is manageable as long as individual preferences do not change.” 
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association with the utility-individualism of welfare economics, even it, as Witt (2003: 91) 
puts it, in a “non-standard utilitarian framework.”28  Yet, Witt has also discussed the welfare 
implications of changing preferences in terms, namely as a matter of regime-choice, that 
appear closer to the choice-individualism of constitutional economics.29 And in a recent joint 
paper with Christian Schubert (Witt and Schubert 2008) he explicitly approaches the issue of 
innovation-policy in reference to a constitutional political economy perspective. 
Witt’s particular concern is with the issue of how the welfare consequences of 
innovations that typically produce a mix of favorable and unfavorable consequences can be 
assessed from an evolutionary perspective, a perspective that not only recognizes that “the 
future balance of benefits and (social) costs of innovativeness cannot be anticipated” but also 
recognizes that “the standard utilitarian framework of unchanging preferences” (Witt 2003: 
90) is untenable in an evolving world. Recognizing these facts, so Witt argues, poses a 
challenge for normative judgments on which economic policy towards innovations may be 
based, because with changing preferences individuals’ present desires can no longer 
considered the adequate criterion for judging policy measure. The remedy that his “more 
objective utilitarian approach” is supposed to provide is to assess different policies, such as 
alternative innovation regimes, not “exclusively according to the current state of our 
preferences” but in terms of “educated guesses … about how we would assess the likely 
outcomes in the light of the probable future state of preferences” (ibid.: 91).  
The question that is of interest in the present context is what function Witt wishes 
“educated guesses about future preferences” to serve in matters of policy advice, whether they 
are meant to provide, in the utility-individualist spirit of welfare economics, the individual 
utility values from which an aggregate measure of social welfare is to be constructed, or 
whether they are supposed, in the choice-individualist spirit of constitutional economics, to 
provide sovereign individuals with information that allows them to make better choices. In its 
utility-individualist interpretation Witt’s “more objective utilitarian approach” would 
obviously be subject to the same objections that have been raised above against the traditional 
welfare economic approach to policy advice, namely that neither of the two meaningful 
addressees of advice in democratic polities, neither the citizens as the ultimate sovereigns nor 
their political representatives, are likely to be interested in the kind of information that 
welfare economic calculations may provide. I shall, therefore, confine my further comments 
                                                 
28 Under this assumption I have discussed Witt’s arguments in Vanberg 2006. 
29 A brief discussion of the choice of policy regimes from “a contractarian point of view” can be found in Witt’s 
1996 paper (Witt 1996: 120). 
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on the alternative, choice-individualist interpretation of Witt’s proposal, asking what role the 
“educated guesses about future preferences” of which he speaks may serve in its context. 
The choice-individualist interpretation is, so one must surely assume, the interpretation 
from which Ulrich Witt and Christian Schubert argue in their joint paper in which they 
contrast Witt’s “more objective utilitarian approach” – they speak of a “somewhat more 
‘objective’ (behavioral) approach” (Witt and Schubert 2008: 204)  – with the subjectivist 
normative individualism of constitutional economics. Their principal charge in this paper is 
that its “radical subjectivist stance … considerably weakens the operational power of 
Constitutional Political Economy,” preventing “practically relevant and normatively plausible 
(conjectural) policy conclusions” (ibid.). In order to correct for this deficiency, so they 
suppose, “additional behavioral hypotheses are needed” that can enlarge “the informational 
base of the contractarian approach to welfare” (ibid.). 
The example that Witt and Schubert use to argue their case is the policy towards 
innovations, an issue that is, as noted above, Witt’s particular concern. Their focus is on the 
choice among alternative innovation regimes, understood as “the rules stipulated in the social 
contract concerning innovativeness” (ibid.: 211). Such regimes differ in the ways in which 
they deal with the problem, inherent in their very nature, that innovations tend to produce not 
only beneficial effects but regularly also impose harmful pecuniary and technological 
externalities on participants in the market game (ibid.: 212; Witt 2003: 91). They may, as Witt 
and Schubert (ibid.: 211) note, “allow more or less innovativeness and … invoke more or less, 
and different forms of regulations on innovativeness.” As extreme types they contrast a 
“laissez faire” regime that does not impose restrictions on innovative endeavors at all with a 
“Pareto” regime that requires unanimous approval of all parties affected (ibid.: 215f.; Witt 
1996: 117ff.), noting that, of course, all kinds of more complex, intermediate regimes are 
conceivable. 
 Because from a subjectivist contractarian perspective individuals’ common 
constitutional interests “are not materially specified” but are “defined in an endogenous, 
procedural way” (Witt and Schubert 2008: 204), constitutional economics is unable, so Witt 
and Schubert (ibid.: 223) charge, to make any substantive normative statements when it 
comes to assess the normative quality of alternative innovation-regimes, and of the irreducible 
trade-offs that they involve, between protecting against negative external effects and allowing 
for potentially welfare-improving innovations (Witt 1996: 126).30 In order to be more specific 
about the content of the innovation regime that people may agree on in their constitutional 
                                                 
30 Witt and Schubert (2008: 211). “In order to reach more concrete (hypothetical) statements as to the normative 
quality of constitutional rules, the traditional radical subjectivism on individual interests is not helpful.” 
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contract it is necessary, as they claim, “to enrich the contractarian model with material 
hypotheses about human behavior” (ibid.: 210), in particular with hypotheses about human 
attitudes towards risk.31 Drawing on such “hypotheses about individuals’ attitudes and the 
systematic changes in them over an individual’s life-span” (ibid.: 204) Witt and Schubert 
come to the conclusion that, as far as the problem of pecuniary externalities is concerned, 
individuals can “be argued to opt for a regime that is supplemented by a social security net” 
(ibid.: 224), and that, with regard to technological externalities, they can be expected “to favor 
a limited liability rule supplemented by publicly funded regulatory agencies” (ibid.).32 
The details of Witt’s and Schubert’s hypotheses about risk attitudes33 and of the 
arguments that lead them to their conclusions about favored regimes need not concern us 
here. Of interest in the present context is the question of how exactly Witt’s “more objective 
(utilitarian or behavioral) approach” may improve, as is the authors’ claim, the analytical 
potential of constitutional economics. In other words: What can the “more objective 
approach” contribute to the project of constitutional political economy, beyond what it is able 
to achieve with its traditional “radical preference subjectivism”? This question cannot be 
answered without drawing some important distinctions. 
First, we need to distinguish between the role that constitutional economics is to play 
in policy advice and the purely empirical, explanatory and predictive, project of coming up 
with conjectures about the factual content of social contracts that individuals actually 
conclude in specific real world settings. With regard to the latter project the kinds of 
contributions that a “more objective (behavioral) approach” in Witt’s and Schubert’s sense 
can make are obviously of great relevance, and one must surely admit that a “radical 
subjectivism” that were to abstain from making substantive assumptions about individuals’ 
preferences would not be of much help in this project. However, since my concern in this 
paper is with the challenge that evolving preferences pose for policy advice, my interest is 
more in the role that constitutional economics is to play in this regard. What can the “more 
objective approach” contribute to this project? 
When seeking to identify the contribution that the “more objective approach” can be 
expected to make to policy advice two questions must be distinguished, namely, first, what 
                                                 
31 Witt and Schubert (2008: 211): “How the social contract is specified in this respect cannot be decided without 
making some assumptions about the citizens’ risk attitudes. Hence, the need for more specific hypotheses about 
these attitudes.” 
32 With regard to technological externalities Witt and Schubert (2008: 219) compare three types of innovation 
regimes, a ’no liability’ regime corresponding to the ‘laissez faire’ regime, a ‘strict liability’ regime 
corresponding to the ‘Pareto’ regime, and a ’limited liability’ regime as intermediate solution. 
33 They emphasize, in particular, that risk attitudes “show a significant inter-personal variance between 
individuals” and that “risk preferences systematically change over time with increasing age” (Witt and Schubert 
2008: 212). 
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legitimizes policy choices and who is entitled to make these choices, and, second, what 
considerations and arguments should inform policy choices. The constitutional economics 
approach that I described above (section 3) gives a clear answer to the first question, namely, 
that the individual citizens as the ultimate sovereigns of a democratic polity are the ones who 
are entitled to make policy choices – and to delegate their decision-making authority to 
representatives – and that their voluntary agreement is the ultimate source from which 
legitimacy in policy matters must be derived. And it gives an equally clear answer to the 
second question, namely, that whatever considerations or arguments can help citizens or their 
representatives to make better informed choices should find entry into the political decision 
making process. These answers have implications for the role that the “more objective 
approach” may play. As far as the legitimacy issue is concerned, the information that this 
approach may provide can surely not provide arguments against the right of the ultimate 
sovereigns, the citizens, to decide policy matters according to their own subjective 
preferences. To respect the citizens as sovereign choosers in policy matters cannot but mean 
to allow their own subjective preferences to decide these matters. As far as the considerations 
and arguments are concerned that should inform policy choices, the information that the 
“more objective approach” may provide has surely its role to play in the political decision 
making process, but its proper addressees must be the citizens – respectively their 
representatives – whom it may help to make better informed choices. 
I should add that how one conceives of the role that constitutional economics is to play 
in policy advice critically depends of course on one’s understanding of the nature of the 
“social contract” that provides the reference point for normative judgment. The important 
distinction here is between an approach that sees to the source of legitimacy in the factual 
contracts that actual persons conclude, and an approach that argues in terms of “hypothetical 
contracts.” Witt and Schubert (ibid.: 207) note that “modern contractarians use the social 
contract device in a hypothetical sense,” as a device for deriving hypotheses about “how 
individual agents would decide within some artificially specified constitutional situation, the 
‘original position’” (ibid.). The version of constitutional economics that I advocate, and that I 
have described above, argues in terms of factual social contracts and is, in this sense, not part 
of what Witt and Schubert describe as “modern contractarianism.” And, in fact, a 
contractarianism that argues in terms of hypothetical contracts would surely be of little 
service in performing the task that I have described above as the main task that constitutional 
economics sees for itself in a democratic polity, namely to assist sovereign citizens with 
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information that help them to realize mutual gains and to advance their common interests.34 A 
contractarian enterprise that produces hypotheses about what would be in citizens’ common 
interests if they were in some artificially specified original position is, as far as its 
contribution to policy advice is concerned, subject to exactly the same objections that have 
been raised above against traditional welfare economics. In a democratic polity it has no 
addressees for its hypothetical imperatives. Neither the citizens nor their representatives can 
be assumed to be interested in information about what would be attractive contracts in a 
hypothetical original position. They are interested in advice that tells them how they can 
advance the interests that they actually harbor, here and now. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Evolving preferences pose problems for a welfare economics that reduces individuals to 
utility functions and for any approach that – in the spirit of a utility-individualism – seeks to 
directly derive normative judgments on policy issues from assumptions about individual 
preferences. And, as I have argued in this paper, whatever solutions for these problems may 
be conceived, as long as they remain within the paradigmatic framework of a utility-
individualism they have little to contribute to effective policy advice in a democratic polity. 
By contrast, evolving preferences are easy to cope with for a constitutional economics that, in 
the spirit of a choice-individualism, respects individuals as sovereign choosers and sees its 
task in providing information to these sovereign choosers for how they may better advance 
their common interests. Neither the undeniable fact that individuals’ preferences may change, 
nor the fact that their current preferences may be an unsuitable standard for judging how they 
will feel about policy choices once their consequences emerge, or the fact that their present 
preferences may be short-sighted and ill-informed, can, from a constitutional economics 
perspective, provide a justification for questioning the sovereignty of individuals as 
consumers and as voters. These facts can only be reasons for providing sovereign individuals 
with arguments that enable them to have a more realistic understanding of their likely future 
preferences and to see that their preferences are less myopic and better informed. But the 
preferences that inform the choices of sovereign individuals cannot be any other than their 
present preferences. 
                                                 
34 In this interpretation of constitutional economics I see myself in agreement with J.M. Buchanan (1987: 313) 
who states: “Normatively, the task of the constitutional political economist is to assist individuals, as citizens 
who ultimately control their own social order, in their continuing search for those rules of the political game that 
will best serve their purposes, whatever these might be.”  
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